The government's response to the Congress's demands was largely dismissive and non-committal:

1. Undefined War Aims: The government refused to define British war aims beyond a general statement that Britain was resisting aggression. This lack of clarity frustrated the Congress's request for specific objectives, especially regarding India's future status.
2. Consultation Process: The government proposed a vague consultation process for potential modifications to the Government of India Act of 1935. This process would involve representatives from various communities, parties, and interests in India, as well as the Indian princes. However, the terms and scope of this consultation were left ambiguous.
3. Consultative Committee: The government announced plans to establish a "consultative committee" whose advice could be sought as needed. Again, details about the composition, functions, and authority of this committee were not provided, leaving its significance uncertain.

Overall, the government's response fell short of addressing the Congress's demands for concrete actions and commitments regarding India's political future and participation in the war effort. Instead, it appeared to deflect the Congress's concerns by emphasizing consultation and vague promises of future engagement.

The British government's approach during World War II revealed a hidden agenda aimed at undermining the Congress and consolidating its control over India:

1. Provoking Confrontation: The British government sought to exploit the war situation to regain control over the Congress by provoking confrontations and using emergency measures to suppress dissent.
2. Acquisition of Draconian Powers: Emergency powers were acquired even before the war, allowing the government to restrict civil liberties and amend laws to its advantage. Secret ordinances were drafted to preemptively target the Congress and justify the use of force against it.
3. International Perception: The British government aimed to garner sympathy and support internationally by portraying the Congress as sympathetic to Axis powers like Japan and Germany. This strategy was intended to justify repressive measures while painting the Congress as a threat to stability.
4. Lack of Intentions for Reform: Despite the Congress's demands for democratic reforms and Indian independence, the British government showed no intention of loosening its grip on power, both during and after the war.

Gandhi and the Congress reacted strongly to the government's tactics, condemning its disregard for Indian public opinion and its perpetuation of imperialist policies. The decision to resign from the Congress ministries in the provinces was a clear rejection of the government's agenda and a demonstration of the Congress's commitment to the cause of Indian independence.

The debate on whether to initiate immediate mass satyagraha intensified following Linlithgow's statement in October 1939. Gandhi and his supporters advocated against immediate struggle for several reasons:

1. Justness of the Allied Cause: They believed that the Allied cause was just, and immediate mass struggle might disrupt this.
2. Communal Sensitivity: There were concerns about communal tensions and the lack of Hindu-Muslim unity, which could lead to communal riots.
3. Congress Organization: The Congress organization was in disarray, and the atmosphere was not conducive to a mass struggle.
4. Readiness of the Masses: The masses were not considered ready for a struggle, and efforts were needed to prepare them.

Instead of immediate mass struggle, Gandhi's faction proposed toning up the Congress organization, conducting political work among the masses, and exhausting all possibilities of negotiation before initiating a struggle.

In January 1940, Linlithgow stated that the goal of British policy in India after the war was Dominion status of the Westminster variety. However, the Congress Working Committee expressed skepticism, believing that the war was being fought for imperialist ends and that British imperialism would remain entrenched in India.

At the Ramgarh session of the Congress in March 1940, while there was consensus on the need for a battle, there was disagreement over the form it should take. Gandhi favored continued cooperation at the provincial level and offered moral support to the British war effort on a non-violent basis. Nehru insisted that complete independence for India must be a precondition for Congress support to the British war effort.

Subhash Bose maintained his militant stance, advocating direct action against the colonial government to force it to grant freedom. The Congress ultimately declared that nothing short of complete independence would be accepted and that civil disobedience would be resorted to when the Congress organization deemed fit or in the event of a crisis.

Meanwhile, the Muslim League passed the Pakistan Resolution in Lahore in March 1940, calling for the creation of independent states for Muslims in areas where they were in the majority.