Indo-China Relations and the Tibetan Crisis

Jawaharlal Nehru envisioned a close bond between India and China, seeing them as two nations that had endured the hardships of colonial rule and were working towards overcoming poverty and underdevelopment. He hoped that both countries would collaborate to elevate Asia's standing in the world. India even advocated for China's representation in the United Nations Security Council. In the Korean War, India did not align with the U.S. in labeling China as an aggressor state.

The Tibetan Crisis: Following the Chinese revolution of 1949, China sought to integrate Tibet into its territory, asserting it as an integral part of China. In 1950, China initiated an offensive in the eastern part of Tibet and took control of the Chamdo region. India protested this aggression but also extended an offer to mediate, in response to Tibet's request. However, China dismissed the proposal, considering the matter an internal affair.

Under the Panchsheel Agreement of 1954, India voluntarily relinquished its military, communication, postal, and other rights over Tibet that it had inherited from the British through the Anglo-Tibetan Treaty of 1904. India also acknowledged China's sovereignty over Tibet. During this agreement, China assured India that Tibet would be granted greater autonomy, though this commitment proved elusive over time.

1962 Chinese Attack and Its Consequences

Jawaharlal Nehru was cognizant of the transformative nature of the Chinese revolution in 1949 and recognized the potential threat it could pose. He acknowledged in a Lok Sabha speech in November 1959, "we know enough history to realize that a strong China is normally an expansionist China."

The 1962 conflict between India and China stemmed from a border dispute that escalated into a full-scale war. Two primary issues contributed to the conflict:

1. Tibet's Annexation: China's absorption of Tibet, which had historically served as a buffer state, complicated the border issue.
2. McMahon Line Dispute: The border delineation between India and China, established by the McMahon Line during British rule, was contested by China, which refused to acknowledge it.

In September 1957, India discovered a 1200 km Chinese military highway passing through Aksai Chin, which was met with strong Indian protest. China's inclusion of the region as its territory in maps further escalated tensions. The situation was exacerbated by India granting asylum to the Dalai Lama, which drew China's ire.

These disputes culminated in the 1962 war when China launched a swift and substantial assault on both Aksai Chin and NEFA (North-East Frontier Agency). While China swiftly withdrew under pressure from both the USA and the USSR, it retained control of Aksai Chin, leaving NEFA under Indian administration.

Nehru faced his first no-confidence motion due to his perceived misjudgment of Chinese intentions. The war prompted a significant shift in India's foreign and security policy. Within two years, China conducted a nuclear test, compelling India to increase defense spending. India's own nuclear tests were a response to threats posed by both Pakistan and China.

The conflict between India and China was enmeshed in the broader global context of the Cold War. India forged a Friendship Treaty with the USSR, while China improved relations with the USA. Normalizing relations between India and China took many years, and the war had a lasting impact on their bilateral relationship.

Aftermath of the 1962 War and Reasons for Failure

Aftermath:

1. Impact on Self-Respect: India took a significant amount of time to recover from the blow to its national pride and self-respect.
2. Restoration of Self-Worth: The victory over Pakistan in the Bangladesh War, in which China and the US supported Pakistan, helped restore India's sense of self-worth.

Reasons for Failure:

1. Failure to Anticipate Attack Nature: The Indian political and military leadership failed to accurately anticipate the precise nature of the Chinese attack.
2. Commander's Flight: The Indian army commander in NEFA fled without making any resistance, leaving the region wide open for Chinese occupation.
3. Forward Policy Provocation: India's refusal to settle borders with China on amicable terms and its adoption of a 'forward policy' since 1959 played a provocative role, ultimately leading to the Chinese attack.
4. Lack of Anticipation of Danger: Despite the revolt in Tibet, arrival of the Dalai Lama, and border clashes, India failed to foresee the imminent threat from Communist China. Nehru did not anticipate that China could pose a threat to India.
5. Miscalculation of Attack Nature: Nehru's miscalculation pertained to the precise nature of the Chinese attack, rather than the foreign policy he pursued.
6. Military Leadership Perspective: The military leadership was focused on the possibility of either border clashes or a full-scale war in the plains of Assam, but did not account for the potential of a limited deep thrust and withdrawal.
7. Defence Management and Planning Flaws: Failure to establish an effective system of higher defence command, lack of defence planning, and flawed civil-military relations contributed to the failure.
8. Logistical and Intelligence Failures: The war highlighted shortcomings in logistics, intelligence gathering, and analysis, as well as coordination between different branches, such as the army and the Air Force.
9. Panic and External Appeals: India's appeal for help from the US and UK in the midst of the crisis, only for the Chinese to withdraw the next day, was viewed as a mistake.
10. Reevaluation of Nehru's Foreign Policy: The war raised doubts about the efficacy and correctness of Nehru's foreign policy, especially in the context of peace and non-alignment.

China aimed to humiliate India to demonstrate the perceived weaknesses of India's policy of peace and non-alignment.

Impact of the 1962 Indo-China War

1. Diverted Resources: Resources earmarked for economic development, particularly the third five-year plan, were redirected towards defence, significantly affecting India's economic development.
2. No-Confidence Motion: In August 1963, Nehru faced and survived his first and only no-confidence motion during his tenure.
3. National Humiliation: The war induced a sense of national humiliation and dealt a blow to India's image both domestically and on the international stage.
4. Criticism of Nehru: Nehru faced severe criticism for his perceived naivety in assessing Chinese intentions and the lack of adequate military preparedness.
5. Prolonged Cold Relations: Relations between India and China remained frosty until 1976.
6. Resumption of Normal Relations: Normalized relations between the two countries resumed in 1976. The then Foreign Minister, B. Vajpayee, became the first top-level Indian leader to visit China in 1979, signifying a thaw in relations.

The aftermath of the war had profound and far-reaching consequences for India, influencing its foreign policy, defence strategy, and national psyche for years to come.

Foreign Policy under Lal Bahadur Shastri

Lal Bahadur Shastri, who succeeded Jawaharlal Nehru as the Prime Minister of India, largely continued Nehru's policy of Non-Alignment. However, he also worked to strengthen ties with the Soviet Union.

Sirima-Shastri Pact (1964): In 1964, Shastri signed an important accord with Sri Lanka to address the issue of Indian Tamils residing in the country. This agreement was considered a significant diplomatic achievement, as it helped resolve a longstanding source of tension between India and Sri Lanka. The pact involved repatriating 525,000 Indian Tamils, while granting Sri Lankan citizenship to 300,000. The process was slated to be completed by 31 October 1981. However, in 1982, India stopped considering further applications for citizenship, claiming that the 1964 agreement had lapsed.

China's Nuclear Explosion (1964): China conducted its first nuclear test during Shastri's tenure. China stated that the purpose of the bomb was solely to protect its citizens from the threat of nuclear weapons. While China declared a "no first use" policy for its nuclear arsenal, this development generated a sense of insecurity not only in India but also in other South Asian countries. During Shastri's time, there was growing pressure from proponents of nuclear capabilities in India, and discussions about India's own nuclear program began to gain traction. This marked a shift in India's nuclear weapons policy from Nehru's era.

These diplomatic initiatives and challenges shaped India's foreign policy under Shastri, showcasing his efforts to navigate complex regional issues and maintain India's commitment to non-alignment.